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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SOME ASPECTS OF LATERAL SUPPORT IN KENTUCKY
The conflicting rights of adjoimng property owners are reconciled normally
on the basis that one is entitled to use his land according to his own taste so long
as he does not invade or interfere with the rights of his neighbor,' and in its
broadest sense this fundamental idea includes the corollary notion that one is
entitled to have his land remain in its natural state, which may require lateral
support from the adjoining land or an artificial support substituted by the adjoimng owner.' There is substantial disagreement, however, as to whether this
well established right to lateral support is in the nature of an easement' or simply
a right incident to the ownership of land. Also, there is a lack of uniformity as
to the extent of the right with respect to the amount of damages recoverable where
the land and buildings thereon are damaged by a subsidence resulting from the
weight of the land itself.' It is the purpose of this note to examine briefly the
Kentucky cases on these two questions with reference to cases from other ]unsdictions where necessary for comparison.
With regard to the nature of the right, the Kentucky Court in Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Bonhaqo, clearly took the position that the right is incident
to the ownership of land, by saying:
"The right of lateral support is an mcident to the land,
and one adjoining or near to has no right to so excavate and dig the
soil as to deprive the land of his neighbor of this support."8 (Italics
writer s)
An examination of later cases fails to reveal any further discussion on tius
point, so it is probably safe to conclude that the Kentucky Court accepts the right
as one incident to the land and not in the nature of an easement. It is submitted
that this position is sound because a right to lateral support is unlike an easement
in several important particulars.
'Stimmel v. Brown, 7 Houst. (Del.) 219, 30 Ad. 996 (1885); Moellering v.
Evans, 121 Ind. 195, 22 N. E. 989 (1889); Spoo v. Garvin, 236 Ky. 113, 32 S. W
2d 715 (1930).
Moody v. McClelland, 39 Ala. 45 (1863); Omel v. Harkins, 8 Bush (Ky.)
650 (1872).
'See
Note, 68 L.R.A. 692 (1904).
4
Green v. Berge, 105 Cal. 52, 38 Pac. 539 (1894); Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122
Mass. 199 (1877); 1 Am. Jun., Adjoining Landowners, see. 21.
'Moody v. McClelland, 39 Ala. 45 (1863); Stimmel v. Brown, 7 Houst.
(Del.) 219, 30 AUt. 996 (1885).
'On most of the other aspects of the problem there is substantial agreement,
e.g.. (1) it is generally held that the right to have land supported m its natural
state does not extend to buildings placed thereon. Prete v. Cray, 49 R. I. 209,
141 Ad. 609, (1928); See Note, 50 A.L.R. 486, (1927) 1 Am. Jun., Adjoining
Landowners, sec. 22. (2) By the weight of authority m this country the right to
have weight of the building supported cannot be acquired by prescription,
TIFFANY, BR.AL PRnOPERTY, sees. 753, 1194, (Ord. ed. 1939). (3) The cause of
the action accrues at the time of the subsidence, (See, 1 Am. JuR., Adjoining
Landowners, secs. 34, 36). (4) Some states have attempted to regulate various
aspects of the problem by statutes. Ky. R. S. 381.440.
794 Ky. 67, 21 S. W 526 (1893).
1Id. at 68, 21 S. W at 527.
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An easement is normally created by a grant, express or implied, whereas
0
the right to lateral support is conceded by all authorities to be a natural right,"
which attaches by mere ownership of the land. Further, the right cannot be
acquired by prescription because there is no need to so acquire it if the land
remains in its natural state. Mere ownership of the land is sufficient. It should
be pointed out that there is no discussion in the cases regarding a right by prescription to have the land supported in its natural state, but according to the
English view the right to have the weight of a building supported by the adjoimng
land can be acquired by prescription." A few American cases seem to follow
this doetnne,2 but it is doubtful whether these courts would actually subscribe
to it if the question were squarely before them. By the great weight of authority
this view has been expressly rejected" on the ground that the owner of the building claiming the prescriptive right has done nothing upon the adjoimng land to
which the adjoimng owner could object; therefore there is nothing on which to
presume that he has assented to its adverse use for the required statutory period.
The position of the Kentucky Court on tlin point indirectly confirms its view as
to the nature of the right. In the early case of Clemens v. Speed," the plaintiff
and defendant were owners of adjacent houses supported by a common or partywall. Defendant after due notice to plaintiff removed her house from the wall
in a careful manner and as a result the support of the plaintiffs house was removed causing it to fall and sustain damage. In seeking to recover damages the
plaintiff claimed a prescriptive right to have is building supported. The court,
in holding for the defendant, rejected the plaintiff's contention because it was
contrary to the whole concept of prescription, which rests upon the principle of
acquiescence to the adverse acts of another. It was pointed out that the defendant's consent could not be presumed merely because she had no remedy to
prevent the plaintiff from building his house and having it supported by her
land for a number of years.
Finally, an easement is an interest in the land of another," while the right
to lateral support as an incidence to the ownership vests no interest in the adjoining land. In a sense there is an element of interest in the right but only to the
extent that it affords a personal action for damages against the adjoimng owner,
or the person who caused the subsidence. Thus, it is readily seen that such an
interest in no way resembles an easement, which is an interest in the land and
necessarily of higher dignity.
It may be argued that the label placed on the nature of the right is relatively
unimportant, since in either case the right will be protected. While it is true
that in most instances the substantive rights of the parties will not be affected by
'Jacksonville Public Service Corp. v. Calhoun Water Co., et al., 219 Ala. 616,
123 So. 79 (1929); TIFFANY, REAL PRopERTY, secs. 776, 779 (3rd. ed. 1939).
"oGilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 (1877).,
TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY, sec. 1194 (3rd. ed. 1939).
'2Stimmel v. Brown, 7 Houst. (Del.) 219, 30 Ad. 996, 997 (1885); and in
Mamer v. Lussem, 65 IM. 484, 491 (1872) where the court said: "There is no
question of prescriptive right. Plaintiffs building was of recent erection." In
neither case was the question of prescriptive right before the court, but it was
merely indicated that the right might be recognized.
"Sullivan v. Zemer, 98 Cal. 346, 33 Pac. 209 (1893); Gilmore v. Driscoll,
122 Mass. 199 (1877); TIFFANY, REAL PRoPERTY, sec. 753 (3rd ed. 1939).
" 93 Ky. 284 (1892).
"Wingard v. Copeland, 64 Wash. 214, 116 Pac. 670 (1911).
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describing the right as an easement in the adjoimng land or a right incident to
the ownership of the land, there are situations where the distinction would be
important. For example, A excavates on his land and then conveys it to B, after
which C's adjoimng land subsides because of the excavation and a cause of action
arises. To whom must C look for Ins damages? Admittedly, under the easement
theory he could very well hold B, who is innocent of any wrong, liable; whereas
under the other theory, A would be liable. Since A was actual wrongdoer this
would seem to be the more equitable result' 6 Should A allow D a third party to
excavate on his land, A's liability would be determined on the basis of agency
or negligence.
From the practicable viewpoint, the amount of damages recoverable for the
damage caused by the subsidence of the land is more important than the nature
of the right. Where the land falls of its own weight the courts find no difficulty
in allowing recovery for damage to the land itself. However, a major difficulty
arises when a building on the land is also damaged by reason of the subsidence.
Actually, most courts have denied recovery for damage to the building irrespective
of whether it increased the lateral pressure.'1 There are a few cases cited as
authority for this position which apparently recognize the possibility of recovery
for damage to the building, but assume that the lateral pressure is increased by
reason of the building. In one of these, the leading case of Moellering v. Evans,"
the court seemed to adhere to the view that if the excavation was performed in
a careful manner, and the house falls because of the additional weight, there could
be no recovery. The case was remanded for a new trial due to error in instructions regarding negligence, and the court did not decide the question of the building increasing the lateral pressure. Another case to the same effect is Moody v.
McClelland," where the court restricted the right to land in its natural state and
not to buildings which have increased the lateral pressure. Since the case was
actually decided on the basis of negligence, the court did not squarely face the
question of increased pressure.
It is submitted, that in a few cases the old common law principle which limited
the support to the land in its natural state, has been retained. Under such view
there is no liability for the damage to the building in the absence of negligence.
even though it did not increase the lateral pressure. There are also other cases
which reach the same result by finding as a matter of law that the building increased the lateral pressure. At an early date, the Kentucky Court recognized the
right of recovery for damage to both land and building, where the subsidence
was not caused by the weight of the building. Thus in Oneil v. Harkzns, it was
implied that the court would hold as a matter of law that an ordinary fence did
not increase the lateral pressure; and it was for the jury to determine whether an
outside privy would increase it. In reference to the fence the court said that its
I See Note, 14 TEMPLE L.Q. 243 (1940).
"7Scranton Coal Co. v. Graff Furnace Co., 289 Fed. 305 (CCA 3rd 1923);
Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220 (1815). The rule is still followed in Mass.
as evidenced by the case of Corcoran v. S. S. Kresege Co., 313 Mass. 299, 47
N. E. 2d 257 (1943), where the court in interpreting a city ordinance providing
that the excavator take proper steps to support the adjoining "earth," held that it
meant the earth in its natural state and thus did not change the common law rule
of non-liability
for damage to buildings on the land.
'8 See 121 Ind. 195, 22 N. E. 989 (1889).
939 Ala. 45 (1863).
See, 8 Bush (Ky.) 650, 653 (Ky. 1872).
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pressure did not depnve the owner of the right to recover for damags to Ins realty.
In using the term realty it is apparent that the court intended to allow recovery
for damage to permanent buildings or any other property on the land falling
within the definition of the term. The rule was succinctly stated in Langhorne v.
Turman,' as follows:
"The rule in this State is that, where a landowner, by
digging on his own land, has deprived the land of his neighbor of its
natural support, he is, whether negligent or not, liable in damages
to his neighbor, not only for the actual injury to the soil, but for
injuries to buildings."'
This rule was quoted with approval in Smith v. Howard,' where the court
in remanding for a new trial recommended an instruction to the effect that there
could be a recovery for damage to personal property in the buildings as well as
the loss of rents and profits. Such an instruction would seem to incorporate the
substance of the well known Tort rule that a plaintiff may recover for all the
direct consequences of the defendant's tortious acts.'
While, as pointed out above, substantial justice will be achieved whether
the right is labeled an easement or a right incident to the ownership of the land,
such is not the case in regard to the conflict as to the extent of recovery where
the land subsides of its own weight and damages a building thereon. If recovery
is allowed for damage to the land and building, the owner is made whole again,
since he is placed in the same position as he was prior to the invasion of his right.
On the other hand, if the extent of liability is limited to damages for the land
only, it is apparent that the injured party has not been made whole. When the
common law rule of denying support to the building was adopted, there was
ample building space, so that it was not necessary to build in such proximity to
the adjoimng land as to require lateral support of the building from it. However,
this situation does not exist today, especially in the cities. It would seem therefore, that the rule should at least be relaxed so as to also allow recovery for the
building when its weight did not contribute to the subsidence, and perhaps it
should be abandoned completely in favor of comprehensive statutory regulations.
Only one aspect of the concept of recovery for damages caused by the subsidence has been discussed; but it will suffice to say that where the excavator is
negligent, recovery is based upon the flow of direct natural consequences from
the negligent act. All courts allow recovery on this basis but there are some
variations as to what constitutes negligence. It is interesting to note that the full
implication of this conclusion is that the right to lateral support, a property interest, is measured as to its extent in terms of negligence on the part of the owner
of the adjoimng land.
HoLLis E. EDMONDS
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Ky. 809, 133 S. W 1008 (1911).
2
d. at 815, 133 S. W at 1011.
=201 Ky. 249, 256 S. W 402 (1923).
PnossEa, ToaTs 340 (1941).

